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Media studies as a field has traditionally been wary of the question of technology. Discussion of 
technology has often been constrained by concerns about technological determinism. In recent times 
there has been renewed interest, however, in the technological dimension of media. In part this is 
doubtless due to rapid changes in media technology, such as the rise of the internet and the digital 
convergence of media technologies. But there are also an increasing number of writers who seem to 
believe that media theory, and more widely social science and the humanities, needs to rethink the 
question of technology and its relationship to society, culture and cultural production. In some ways 
this move might reinvigorate debate about the ways in which technology has been understood in the 
humanities. Andrew Feenberg has characterized the two most dominant positions as, on the one hand, 
the social constructivist or ‘technology studies’ approach to technology, and, on the other, the 
‘substantivist’ theory of technology.1   
The first of these, the social constructivist approach, aims to show how the development of 
technology is shaped not by technical and scientific progress but by contingent social, cultural and 
economic forces. A well known example of this is given in Pinch and Bijker’s discussion of the 
evolution of the bicycle. Pinch and Bijker resist the idea that the early evolution of the bicycle 
represented a linear progression driven by technological innovation.  From the perspective of a linear 
1 Andrew Feenberg, ‘Modernity Theory and Technology Studies’, in A. Feenberg, T.J. Misa and P. Brey (eds), Modernity 
and Technology, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2003, p74–5.
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progression it seems as if the ‘safety bicycle’, that is, the form of the bicycle which we are most 
familiar is the natural and inevitable outcome of technological progress. Instead Pinch and Bijker  
argue for a ‘multi-directional model’, where competing social factors shaped technological evolution.2 
They argue that, far from being driven by developing technology, in fact the competing needs of 
different social groups led to the outcome in which the safety bicycle prevailed.  An especially 
important factor was the popularity of cycling among women – the safety bicycle was much easier to 
mount for a woman wearing a long dress. Although not explicitly ‘constructivist’, a similar argument 
can be found in Raymond Williams’s well known discussion of television. Williams urges caution 
about the claims made for the transformative power of communications systems such as to be found in 
the ‘apparently sophisticated technological determinism’ of Marshall McLuhan.3 He argues that 
television technology, for which all the essential building blocks were in place by the end of the 
nineteenth century, did not really take off until some time later in response to the imperatives of what 
Williams calls ‘mobile privatisation’, that is, ‘on the one hand mobility, on the other hand the more 
apparently self-sufficient family home’.4 Television is a response to a particular social need arising 
from industrialised and urbanised societies and the shift from public to private domestic space. 
It is especially a characteristic of the communication systems that all were foreseen – not in
a utopian but in technical ways – before the crucial components of the developed systems 
had been discovered and refined. In no way is this a history of communications systems 
creating a new society or new social conditions. The decisive and earlier transformation of 
industrial production, and its new social forms … created new needs but also new 
possibilities, and the communications systems, down to television were their intrinsic 
outcome.5
Television therefore needs to be understood in the context of ongoing social changes and not in 
terms of the inherent or formal qualities of the medium.  The strength of this broadly constructivist 
2 Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science 
and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other’, Social Studies of Science, 14, 3 (1984): 399–441, p411.
3 Raymond Williams, Television, Technology and Cultural Form, London, Routledge, 1990, p127.
4 Ibid., p26.
5 Ibid., p19.
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approach, then, is that it shows the rootedness of the technical in social processes. The limitation of this
view, however, is that it tends to see technology as no different from any other social process and it 
may lose the ability to distinguish between the technical object and any other social formation or 
cultural artefact. Andrew Feenberg argues that social constructivists ‘lose part of the truth when they 
emphasise only the social complexity and embeddedness of technology and minimise the distinctive 
emphasis on top-down control that accompanies technical rationalisation’  and ‘…constructivist 
technology studies complicates the notion of progress at the risk of dissolving it altogether’.6 
On the other hand, social and cultural studies has also been influenced by what Feenberg thinks of 
as the ‘substantivist’ approach to technology.  The substantivist group think that technology is neither 
simply a tool nor a social or cultural artifact but a substantial force which alters our relationship with 
the world. Key thinkers to whom Feenberg attributes this view include Habermas and Heidegger. As 
Feenberg puts it: 
These “substantive” theories of technology attribute a more than instrumental, a 
substantive, content to technical mediation …The tools we use shape our way of life in 
modern societies where technique has become all pervasive. In this situation, means and 
ends cannot be separated. How we do things determines who we are. Technological 
development transforms what it is to be human.7 
Of course these two positions are not simply opposed in the sense that Heidegger and Habermas are 
no more technological determinists than Pinch and Bijker. It is rather that the ‘substantivists’, as 
Feenberg calls them (not unproblematically), understand technology and the technical not simply in the
narrow sense of objects and artifacts but in the wider sense as technological thinking about the world. 
What Feenberg in fact goes to argue for is a synthesis of these two approaches on the basis that they are
both modes of interpretation: 
On the one hand [i.e., for social constructivists], the evolution of technologies depends on 
6  Feenberg, ‘Modernity Theory and Technology Studies’, op. cit., p74,79.
7 Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology, London, Routledge, 1999, pp2–3.
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the interpretative practises of their users. On the other hand, [i.e., for ‘substantivists’] 
human beings are essentially interpreters shaped by world-disclosing technologies. [...] A 
synthesis must enable us to understand the central role of technology in modern life as both 
technically rational in form and rich in socially specific content.8 
But in some ways, however productive his distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘constructivist’ 
approaches seems, this synthesis that Feenberg advocates may also be reductive. From the Feenberg 
point of view these two positions seem to be simply different ways of thinking about the same thing. 
That is, there is a consistent phenomenon called technology that is somehow being interpreted 
differently, or in a different mode by, for example, Heidegger and Pinch and Bijker. Feenberg’s 
analysis misses the most obvious distinction between these two ways of thinking: that for 
constructivists the ‘meaning’ of technology is relatively unambiguous; what is at stake for them is 
rather the question of whether social and cultural forces or scientific progress ‘shape’ technological 
evolution. However for Heidegger it is exactly the meaning of technology that is problematic. Indeed in
questioning this meaning Heidegger from the beginning argues that ‘the essence of technology is by no 
means anything technological’.9 Given that Heidegger favors an understanding of tekhne that is quite 
distinct from what he sees as the modern, narrow understanding as a ‘means to an end’, one is entitled 
to wonder whether Heidegger’s ‘substantivist’ approach really means the same thing by the word 
‘technology’ as Feenberg’s ‘constructivists’. One might well question the idea that these two 
‘interpretations’ of technology are synthesisable at all, or whether they are in fact radically 
heterogeneous. In fact what both approaches may have in common is rather a failure to think through 
the implications of an inseparability of the cultural and the technical that they both recognise. What 
Feenberg is calling the constructivist approach, in particular, is marked by a desire to demonstrate that 
technological developments are inseparable from the social and cultural practices in which they 
emerge. However it largely neglects the reciprocal consequence of this co-implication: the dependence 
8 Feenberg, ‘Modernity Theory and Technology Studies’, op. cit., p95.
9 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, New York, Harper and Row, 1977, p4.
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of social and cultural practices on its technological supports. This neglect seems to be motivated a 
suspicion of technological determinism and such constructivist fears are very much embedded in the 
development of media theory.  As Caroline Bassett puts it:
If media theory rarely begins with technology then this may be because media theorists, 
haunted by the spectre of technological determinism, are afraid of material technologies in 
their specificity and their particularity, preferring to deal with technology by ‘dissolving it 
in culture and discourse’.10
From the perspective of media theory it has been attractive to see technology as a subset of the cultural 
artifact and not vice versa, therefore explaining technology in terms of culture and society. But there 
are powerful arguments for arguing something like the opposite: in other words for understanding 
culture and society in terms of or as technical objects. In recent years this argument has been put most 
forcefully by the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler. 
What Stiegler calls ‘technics’ (la technique) is not simply modern technology. Technics comprises ev-
erything from primitive tools to systems of writing.  Stiegler rejects an opposition between technics and
culture indeed, ‘technics is the condition of culture’.11 Human culture is the product of technics as the
prosthetic relationship between the human and its ‘exteriorisation’ in matter. Technics therefore does
not have the instrumental sense of technology as a tool that the human makes use of but rather defines
the human as no longer simply a biological being. Stiegler therefore also refers to what he calls ‘epi-
phylogenesis’, that is a type of human evolution that is no longer thought of in merely biological terms
(phylogenesis) but is essentially to be found in the development of the human’s technical supports or
‘organised inorganic matter’.12  As he puts it: ‘The evolution of the “prosthesis”, not itself living, by
10 Caroline Bassett, The Arc and the Machine: Narrative and New Media, Manchester University Press, 2007, p47–8. 
Bassett is quoting Tiziana Terranova, ‘Infallible Universal Happiness: media technology and creativity’, in A. Dimitrakaki, 
P. Skelton and W.A. Library (eds), Private Views: Spaces and Gender in Contemporary Art from Britain and Estonia, 
London, Women’s Art Library, 2000, p111.
11 Bernard Stiegler, Philosopher Par Accident: Entretiens Avec Élie During, Paris, Galilée, 2004, p59.
12 Ibid., p49.
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which the human is nonetheless defined as a living being, constitutes the reality of the human’s evolu-
tion, as if, with it, the history of life were to continue by means other than life’.13
However, it is important to understand that what Stiegler seeks is not simply a new thinking of the 
relationship between the human and technics, but technics as a challenge to thinking and philosophy 
itself. In this sense Stiegler resists the description of a ‘philosopher of technics’: 
I do not consider myself as a “philosopher of technics”, but rather as a philosopher who 
tries to contribute, along with some others, to establishing that the philosophical question is,
and is throughout, the endurance of a condition which I call techno-logical: at the same 
time technics and logic, from the beginning forged on the cross which language and the tool
form, that is, which allow the human its exteriorization. In my work I try to show that, 
since its origin, philosophy has endured this technological condition, but as repression and 
denial and that is the entire difficulty of my undertaking—to show that philosophy begins 
with the repression of its proper question.14
As Stiegler’s words suggest, what is significant here is not simply the history of technics as 
epiphylogenesis , but the deconstruction of philosophy’s approach to technicity in general. Indeed a 
large part of Stiegler’s published work is dedicated to exploring how the ‘technological condition’, as 
he puts it above, is repressed in the work of philosophers such as Rousseau, Kant, Husserl and 
Heidegger. 
In this sense Stiegler is an inheritor of the deconstructive turn in philosophy initiated by his mentor, 
Jacques Derrida, while pushing it in the direction of a positive thesis about technics that Derrida would 
doubtless not himself have supported.15 In recent work he has clarified this distance from Derrida as a 
recuperation of critical thinking in the form of what he calls ‘pharmacological critique’, a concept 
which I elaborate on a little further shortly.16 
13 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: 1. The Fault of Epimetheus, Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (trans.), 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998, p50.
14 Stiegler, Philosopher Par Accident, op. cit., p14–5.
15  For a longer description of the relationship between Derrida and Stiegler see Ben Roberts, ‘Stiegler Reading Derrida: 
The Prosthesis of Deconstruction in Technics’, Postmodern Culture, 16, 1 (2005); Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Emergencies’,
The Oxford Literary Review, 18, 1–2 (1996): 175–216.
16 On the relationship between deconstruction and critique see Bernard Stiegler, For a New Critique of Political Economy, 
Daniel Ross (trans.), Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010, p15.
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A second important aspect to Stiegler’s thesis is his understanding of technics as accidentality. In part
Stiegler explains this allegorically through the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus. The version of the
myth recounted in the Protagoras is as follows. Epimetheus is allotting powers to mortal creatures. He
allocates characteristics like speed and strength to the animals in a balanced manner so that no species
is too strong and no species will be destroyed. Having completed this distribution it appears that he has
forgotten  humans  (leaving  them  ‘naked,  unshod,  unbedded  and  unarmed’).17 When  his  brother
Prometheus discovers the error he steals from Hephaestus and Athena skill in the arts and fire. Essen-
tially Stiegler emphasises here the ‘Epimethean’ side of the myth. What is important, then, is that the
human is the result of an accident, a deviation from the usual path which leaves it lacking an essence: : 
Before the deviation, there is nothing. Then the accidental event happens, the fault of 
Epimetheus: to have forgotten humans. Humans are the forgotten ones. Humans only occur 
through their being forgotten; they only appear in disappearing.18
Humans, unlike animals, are originally nothing: they are constituted by a lack. The crucial figure 
here for Stiegler is not Prometheus, but Epimetheus, who through forgetting the human constitutes, this
original fault or default (défaut). This Epimethean reading of the myth therefore discloses the way in 
which Stiegler sees technics as accidentality.  Technics is what supplements a lack of origin or essence 
(following a logic of supplementarity which is clearly Derridean). The point is not to replace humanism
with technological determinism but rather that the human, lacking an essence, is constituted 
contingently through technics as becoming:
Mortals, having no qualities except by default, prosthetically, are on the contrary, animals 
condemned to seek ceaselessly their quality, that is, their destiny, that is, their time [...] 
Humans are only by default. That means, they are only in as much as they become.19
17 Plato, The Collected Dialogues, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, p321c.
18 Stiegler, Technics and Time: 1. The Fault of Epimetheus, op. cit., p188.Stiegler, Technics and Time: 1. The Fault of 
Epimetheus, op. cit., p188.Stiegler, Technics and Time: 1. The Fault of Epimetheus, op. cit., p188.
19 Stiegler, Philosopher Par Accident, op. cit., p43.. 
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We can now begin to see how Stiegler ideas around technics refigure or displace the opposition 
between social constructivism and technological determinism. Technics is not understood in the narrow
sense of techno-scientific technology but in the wider sense of all the ways in which the human is 
exteriorised into artifacts or organized inorganic matter. It is thus inseparable from culture and society 
and one cannot talk of technics determining culture and society. Culture and society are not determined
by technics, but rather materialised through it. Indeed arguments around causality and determinism 
founder on Stiegler’s crucial observation in the first volume of Technics and Time that the relationship 
between the human and the technical is essentially one of aporia. The default of origin (of the human) 
in Stiegler’s account is tied to the aporia of the ‘who’ and ‘what’, or the ‘paradox of an exteriorisation 
without a preceding interior’.20 The aporia of origin here is that there is no origin of the ‘who’ in the 
‘what’ or origin of the ‘what’ in the ‘who’ but only an unknowable and aporetic complication of the 
two, the ‘who-what’. The origin of the who is aporetic therefore in the sense of being unthinkable.  
Secondly technics in Stiegler’s sense does not represent scientific progress or a deterministic evolution;
rather, however strange this may seem, technics implies a kind of pure accidentality or contingency. 
For Stiegler, paradoxically, it is because of the exteriorisation of the human into technics, artifacts or 
inorganic organized matter that culture and society constitute themselves contingently. This is because 
such technical supports constitute a form of ‘epiphylogenetic’ memory that allows the human to break 
with its biological program. This point about contingency, derived in part of from Stiegler’s reading of 
Gilbert Simondon, resonates with Adrian Mackenzie’s account, also influenced by Simondon, of 
technology and radical contingency:
The sources of radical contingency do not reside in the subject or the predicates of 
consciousness, nor in any body as such. Rather, they stem from the limits of thinkability of 
bodies, from the ways in which they have no possible outline or form. The a-signifying 
status of matter … can then be understood as a residue of historically interwoven 
20 Stiegler, Technics and Time: 1. The Fault of Epimetheus, op. cit., p141.Stiegler, Technics and Time: 1. The Fault of 
Epimetheus, op. cit., p141.
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institutions, practices and discourses through which inherent corporeal divergences are 
realigned and held in tension.... The materiality of technology itself should be examined 
together with that of living bodies.21
Seeing the potential of technology as a source of contingency, rather than as a limit or threat to it, 
moves the debate about technology on in an important manner. In a fairly obvious way they reverse the
assumption evident in what Feenberg calls ‘constructivism’ to see human users as the source of 
contingency in technological evolution –here it is the contingent evolution (or individuation) of 
technology itself that constitutes the ‘human’ as contingent. These two sides of Stiegler’s approach–the
aporia of the ‘who’ and ‘what’ and his understanding of technics as accidentality—therefore mark an 
important break with the philosophy of technology, particularly Feenberg’s distinction between 
constructivism and substantivism. In particular, they allow him to develop a position with a 
sophisticated understanding of the coimplication of the social and technical while retaining the critical 
aspects of ‘substantivist’ approaches such as those of Habermas and Heidegger.  
As has already been pointed out, for Stiegler technics is not to be identified simply with modern 
technology. Moreover, he resists the idea that the modern epoch is characterised by a confrontation 
between technology and tradition, or technology and culture. Culture, for Stiegler, is always already 
technical. On the other hand, he does see the modern epoch of technics as being distinctive: 
Man is a cultural being to the extent that he is also essentially a technical being: it is 
because he is surrounded by this tertiary technical memory that he can accumulate the 
intergenerational experience that is often called culture — that is why it is absurd to oppose
technics to culture. Technics is the condition of culture in as much as it permits 
transmission. On the other hand, there is an epoch of technics, called technology, and this is
our epoch, when culture is in crisis, precisely because it has become industrial and as such 
finds itself submitted to the imperatives of market calculation.22
Thus for Stiegler, if there is a crisis caused by modern technology it is not because something 
21 Adrian Mackenzie, Transductions: Bodies and Machines at Speed, Continuum, 2002, p54.
22 Stiegler, Philosopher Par Accident, op. cit., p59.
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‘natural’ or human is supplanted by something technological. Rather it is because there has been a 
transformation in technics itself, in the essential technicity that belongs to the human. To be more 
specific there has been a transformation in a specific form of technics that Stiegler calls 
‘mnemotechnics’ or tertiary memory. Technical objects all support a type of cultural, non-genetic or 
‘epiphylogenetic’, memory, but there is a subset that ‘one must call mnemotechnics, to speak 
properly’,23 a type of technics that is specifically ‘made for keeping memory’.24 Stiegler also calls 
mnemotechnics ‘tertiary memory’, a term that he derives from Husserl’s discussion of memory. 
Husserl distinguishes between primary retention or memory and secondary retention or memory. 
Primary retention is the kind of memory that is necessary to perceive a temporal object such as a 
melody: in effect the melody will not exist as an object of perception unless the listener retains or 
remembers the notes that precede the one that is currently heard.25 Secondary retention is, as it were, 
the more traditional understanding of memory where, for example, I remember a melody I heard last 
week. There is also a third kind of memory, which Husserl calls ‘image consciousness’ and Stiegler 
calls ‘tertiary memory’ where an external object, such as a picture or photograph, reactivates a 
memory. Now for Husserl primary memory can be rigorously distinguished from secondary or tertiary 
memory because it belongs to the act of perception itself, whereas secondary or tertiary memory 
involve acts of imaginative selection.26 Secondary and tertiary memory are thus derivative from 
primary memory. For Stiegler, however, something like the reverse is true: tertiary memory, the 
exteriorization of memory into technical objects—mnemotechnics—is constitutive of primary memory,
23 Ibid., p59.
24  ‘faite pour garder la mémoire’ : Stiegler, Philosopher Par Accident, op. cit., p60.
25 See Bernard Stiegler, La Technique Et Le Temps: 3. Le Temps Du Cinéma Et La Question Du Mal-être, Paris, Galilée, 
2001, p37. 
26 This is also because, as Derrida argues, Husserl wants to make a rigorous distinction between retention and 
representation: ‘Husserl would refuse to assimilate the necessity of retention and the necessity of signs, for it is only the 
latter which (like the image) belong to the genus of representation and symbolism. Moreover, Husserl cannot give up 
this rigorous distinction without bringing into question the axiomatic principium of phenomenology itself . . . The 
frontier must pass not between the pure present and nonpresent, i.e., between the actuality and nonactuality of a living 
now, but rather between two forms of the re-turn or re-stitution of the present: re-tention and re-presentation. Jacques 
Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, David B. Allison (trans.), Evanston, Northwestern UP, 1973, p66. 
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secondary memory or our perception of the temporal object.27 
One obvious example of mnemotechnics is writing and indeed Stiegler dedicates a large part of the 
second volume of La technique et le temps, La Désorientation to a discussion of the transformation in 
mnemotechnics represented by the shift to orthographic writing.28 However, it is in a new 
transformation in the course of mnemotechnics, one represented by the audiovisual tele-technologies of
mass media, that lies the cultural crisis of which Stiegler writes. In part this is because these new forms 
of audio-visual recording introduce a new class of industrial temporal object and therefore a new 
relation between primary, secondary and tertiary memory. Stiegler illustrates this through the example 
of the repeated listenings afforded by the gramophone record: 
You only have to listen twice to the same melody to see that between the two auditions, 
consciousness (the ear, here) never hears the same thing: something has occurred. Each 
new audition affords a new phenomenon, richer if the music is good, less so if not, and that 
is why the music lover is an aficionado of repeated auditions—a variation of selections …
From one audition to the next the ear is not the same, precisely because the ear of the 
second audition has been affected by the first.
In other words, the perception of the temporal object (primary memory) is affected here by the 
imaginative selections constituted through secondary and tertiary memory. 
Loss of individuation and symbolic misery
Simondon had shown that the appearance of the machine tool had caused what he called a 
loss of individuation for the worker, deprived of his knowledge and reduced to the 
condition of a pure servant of the machine which, having exteriorised this knowledge, had 
itself become the technical individual in place of the worker. In fact, in this sense, 
Simondon was reinterpreting analyses in Marx’s manuscripts. With analogue technologies 
of the temporal object, a new loss of individuation is produced: one which tends to deprived
consciousnesses of their diachronicity, that is, of their singularity.29
27 For further discussion of this argument about Husserl in Stiegler please see Ben Roberts, ‘Cinema as mnemotechnics: 
Bernard Stiegler and the industrialisation of memory’, Angelaki, 11, 1 (2006): 55–63; Mark B. N Hansen, ‘The Time of 
Affect, or Bearing Witness to Life’, Critical Inquiry, 30, Spring (2004): 584–626; Patrick Crogan, ‘Essential Viewing: 
Bernard Stiegler (2001) La technique et le temps 3: Le temps du cinéma et la question du mal-être’, Film-Philosophy, 
10, 2 (2009) <http://www.film-philosophy.com/index.php/f-p/article/view/166>. 
28 See Bernard Stiegler, La Technique Et Le Temps: 2. La Désorientation, Paris, Galilée, 1996, pp67–73. 
29 Stiegler, Philosopher Par Accident, op. cit., p90–1.
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Here Stiegler refers to Gilbert Simondon, the French thinker of technology, a key influence on his work
(as indeed on that of Deleuze).30  The concept of individuation is central to Simondon’s work and is at
the heart of Stiegler’s own understanding of technics and technicity. Simondon stresses the need, ‘to
understand the individual from the perspective of the process of individuation rather than the process of
individuation by means of the individual’.31 The process of individuation is thus primordial and Simon-
don urges us to see the individual not as a substantial or hylemorphic entity but rather as a ‘metastable’
equilibrium within this process or ontogenesis. In Du mode d'existence des objets techniques (On the
Mode of Existence of Technical Objects), Simondon argues that the rise of the machine tool removes
the ability of the skilled worker to differentiate their labor from that of other workers: a ‘a loss of indi-
viduation’ which Stiegler sees reproduced at the level of consciousness by the new teletechnologies and
their industrialisation of memory. He adds to Simondon’s analysis the idea that the process of industri-
alisation is also a grammatisation, that is to say a process, analogous to that of the development of writ-
ing, by which idiomatic actions (for example, those of the weaver) are standardised, discretised and
materialised (for example, in the Jacquard loom).32 As he puts it, ‘[t]he current loss of individuation is a
stage of grammatisation where three individuations, psychic, collective and techno-machinic, gener-
alise the formalisation by calculation’.33 However he also makes a break with Simondon, arguing that
the latter failed to connect his twin theses about technical individuation, on the one hand, and psychic
or collective individuation on the other.34 For Stiegler, psychosocial individuation depends on a preindi-
30 On the relationship between Deleuze and Simondon see Alberto Toscano, ‘La disparation: politique et sujet chez 
Simondon’, Multitudes, 18 (2004) <http://multitudes.samizdat.net/article.php3?id_article=1576> [accessed 15 June 
2009].
31 Gilbert Simondon, ‘The Genesis of the Individual’, in J. Crary and K. Sanford (eds), Mark Cohen and Kwinter Sanford 
(trans.), Zone 6: Incorporations, Zone Books, 1992, p300.
32 Stiegler, For a New Critique of Political Economy, op. cit., pp10–11.Stiegler, For a New Critique of Political Economy, 
op. cit., pp10–11.
33 Bernard Stiegler, De La Misère Symbolique: 1. L’époque Hyperindustrielle, Paris, Galilée, 2004, p142.
34 Stiegler finds it surprising that Simondon doesn’t think these two modes of individuation together. See Bernard Stiegler, 
‘Temps et individuation technique, psychique, et collective dans l’oeuvre de Simondon’, Futur Antérieur, 19-20 (1993) 
<http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Temps-et-individuation-technique.html> [accessed 3 June 2009]; Stiegler, De La Misère
Symbolique: 1. L’époque Hyperindustrielle, op. cit., pp106, 141.
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vidual that is essentially constituted through organised, inorganic objects or technics. Technical indi-
viduation is thus inseparable from psychic and collective individuation and new forms of mnemotech-
nics represent challenges to this process of transindividuation.  It is in this context that Stiegler de-
scribes the rise of new ‘orthothetic’ analogue and digital recording technologies as marking a break
with the recording technology of orthographic writing.35 To understand what Stiegler thinks is different
in these new technologies it is first necessary to understand the significance of orthographic writing,
which he describes in the second volume of La technique et le temps (‘La désorientation’). As will be
seen, Stiegler blends Simondonian ideas about individuation both with concepts of authenticity and sin-
gularity drawn, in part, from Heidegger and with the idea of différance taken from Derrida.
Orthographic writing (as opposed to pictographic inscription) is marked by its ability to break with 
the context of its inscription and a certain (mechanical) certainty in its reproduction (or exactitude, as 
Stiegler has it). This certainty of a mechanical, ‘exact’ possibility of repetition, the possibility of an 
absolute break with context, does not eliminate context or determine the reading of the text to be the 
same everywhere; rather, Stiegler argues, it is the condition of textuality, or a certain open-ended 
indeterminacy that any text exhibits. The possibility of being read again, of recontextualization means 
that the text is never in fact closed.36 Therefore, for Stiegler, the ‘exactness’ of repetition, or, as it were, 
the ‘transparency’ of the orthographical mark in its ability to be reproduced outside the context of its 
inscription, is the condition of what Stiegler calls here a ‘paradoxical opacity’: because the mark is 
35 ‘Orthothetic’ is Stiegler’s neologism of which Stiegler comments: ‘I have had to construct this neologism on the basis of
the Greek words orthotès and thésis. The orthotès signifies exactitude, and the thésis situation [position]. The utterances 
that I call “orthothetic” (as is the case with alphabetic utterances) set down [posent] the past exactly.’ (‘J’ai dû construire
ce néologisme à partir des mots grec orthotès et thésis. L’orthotès signifie l’exactitude, et la thésis la position. Les 
énoncés que je dis «orthothétiques» (c’est le cas des énoncés alphabétiques) posent exactement le passé’: Stiegler, 
Philosopher Par Accident, op. cit., p64–5.
36  There is an important problem with Stiegler’s argument here, an argument which tends to make it seem as if the 
possibility of recontextualisation is simply constituted by the orthographic mark. But in fact such a possibility is equally 
and irreducibly tied to the possibility of a new context, i.e., spatial and temporal alterity. Moreover the orthographic 
mark can never simply be constitutive of the relationship to (e.g., temporal) alterity because it is constituted itself as the 
mark that it is through its relationship with alterity. This is essentially an argument around iteration that Stiegler borrows
from Derrida (see ‘Signature Event Context’: Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass (trans.), Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1982, p307–40.
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fixed, mechanically and programmatically iterable, its meaning is never fixed.37 Now the second 
argument here—one that returns us to the question of the relationship between the ‘program’ and the 
‘improbable’ that has been sketched in the first volume of La technique et le temps in relation to Dasein
—is that this relationship between the certainty or exactitude of the orthographic reproduction of the 
text and the ‘paradoxical opacity’ of its interpretation (infinitely recontextualizable, therefore infinitely 
open to new interpretations) also constitutes the textuality of the reader’s identity as ‘une identité 
differante’, a deferring and differing identity, an identity that experiences the difference of identity 
through temporal deferral: 
The who discovers their textuality in confronting the orthographic deferring and differing of
identity (or literal synthesis) because, in losing the identity of the same text when they read 
and repeat it in different contexts, it is their own identity that is placed in crisis …At the 
moment when they discover that the same text varies and derives indefinitely in the 
dissemination that is all contextualisation, the reader is caught in a process of irreducible 
différance to the extent that the here and the now, space and time, are irreducible, to the 
extent also that they discover themselves to be textual, themselves to be tissued by past 
statements [énoncés], already-there, their own, those that they have themselves lived, as 
well as those which they have inherited and which must be unceasingly interpreted.38
In effect, the reader is constituted as the indefinite possibility of recontextualization. The ‘program’ 
of exact orthographic inscription does not determine the ‘who’ but rather frees it to experience itself as 
the indeterminacy of recontextualization and the irreducibility of context.39 However, the new industrial
temporal objects of analogue and digital recording represent a new relationship between singularity, 
consciousness and time: 
The society of industrial temporal objects thus transforms our existences into a 
prefabricated series of clichés that we string together without perceiving very much. The 
coincidence of the time of the industrial temporal objects’ flow with our consciousnesses 
has the consequence that, in making them our objects of consciousness, that is, of attention,
we embrace and adopt their time: we adhere to them in such great intimacy that they come 
to substitute themselves for the proper temporalities of our consciousnesses. Such is the 
37 Stiegler, La Désorientation, op. cit., p70–1.
38 Ibid., p72.
39 Ibid., p72–3.
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catastrophic utilization, by cultural industries, of the power of temporal objects, which 
results in a ecological catastrophe in the milieu of spirit that is epiphylogenesis.40
The passivity which is ascribed here to the relationship with industrial temporal objects is inevitably 
reminiscent of Frankfurt School approaches to mass media. Indeed Stiegler’s whole approach to 
understanding media as industrialization clearly recalls Adorno and Horkheimer’s discussion of‘culture
industry’ (Kulturindustrie), a connection which is explicitly discussed in La désorientation.41 In 
general, media theory since the Frankfurt School has been keen to resist the pessimism of its view of 
mass media and, in particular, to demonstrate the active (rather than passive) role that the audience play
in the construction of media meaning.42 There has been a shift from the study of the conditions of 
production (industrial or otherwise) of mass media to the study of the conditions of media 
consumption, which is particularly evident in audience studies. 
Despite the distance that he puts between his own position and the work of Adorno (or Marcuse, for 
that matter) there are good reasons for thinking that he is indeed an heir of what we might call, with 
Feenberg, ‘critical theory of technology’.43 He shares with Marcuse (and Feenberg) a vision of modern 
technology as a ‘quasi-dystopian system that might be changed through political action’.44 He also 
obviously shares with this tradition a focus on the relationship between technology and what he thinks 
of as ‘hyperindustrial’ capitalism, a relationship which brings about a new ‘cognitive and affective 
proletarianisation’.45  This alignment is arguably underlined by the affirmation of critique – and indeed 
political economy – in For a New Critique of Political Economy.46 However, Stiegler’s argument about
40 Stiegler, Philosopher Par Accident, op. cit., p85–6.
41  See Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. On the connection with Adorno and Horkheimer, see 
Roberts, ‘Cinema as Mnemotechnics’, op. cit.
42  See  David Morley, Television, Audiences, and Cultural Studies, London, Routledge, 1992, p45–8; Shaun Moores, 
Interpreting Audiences: The Ethnography of Media Consumption, London, Sage, 1993.
Morley, op. cit., p45–8; Moores, op. cit.
43 Andrew Feenberg, ‘Critical Theory of Technology’, in J.-K.B. Olsen, S.A. Pedersen and V.F. Hendricks (eds), A 
Companion to the Philosophy of Technology, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
44 Ibid., p147.
45 Bernard Stiegler, Pour Une Nouvelle Critique De L’économie Politique, Paris, Galilée, 2009, p45.
46 Stiegler, For a New Critique of Political Economy, op. cit.Stiegler, For a New Critique of Political Economy, op. cit.
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mass media and industrialization is actually quite different from that of the Frankfurt School. For 
Adorno and Horkheimer, the rise of culture industry can be tied to forms of mass media where 
technology comes to usurp the place of a properly human ability to schematize.47 For Stiegler, on the 
question, it is never a question of a technical dehumanization—the ‘human’ is always already technics. 
The issue is rather understanding a shift within technical individuation that allows for the 
‘industrialization’ of memory. Indeed as he tries to show in Le temps du cinéma, the schematisation is 
also technical.48 The important point, as Robert Sinnerbrink points out, is that ‘the Frankfurt school 
analysis of the “culture industry” remains caught within the prevailing instrumental-anthropological 
understanding of technology’.49 Stiegler, on the other hand, drawing on Simondon, Heidegger and 
Derrida, sees that the relationship between the human and technology is fundamentally one of aporia or
transduction, where both terms are constituted by their relation. This means that his arguments 
concerning the ‘industrialisation of memory’ are working with a very different understanding of what 
industrialisation means. Since exteriorisation or grammatisation are in some sense essential – we can’t 
do without them – the critique offered by Stiegler is in some sense more nuanced. It is, as he would put 
it, a ‘pharmacological critique’, one which understands mnemotechnics as both poison and remedy. 
This pharmacological approach also means that he doesn’t quite share the pessimism of the Frankfurt 
school. As Mark Hansen has argued, ‘[w]hat is perhaps most striking about Stiegler’s analysis is its 
success in diagnosing what he calls the “symbolic misery” of contemporary cultural existence (or 
‘subsistence’) without losing hope for the future’.50 
Stiegler’s work therefore remains relevant to media theory. One reason is the currently shifting 
ground of the discipline of media studies itself. As Nick Couldry has argued:  
47Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, London, Verso, 1979, p124.
48 Stiegler, Le Temps Du Cinéma, op. cit.See also Crogan, op. cit.
49 Robert Sinnerbrink, ‘Culture Industry Redux: Stiegler and Derrida on Technics and Cultural Politics’, Transformations, ,
17, 2009 <http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_17/article_05.shtml> [accessed 19 November 2009].
50 Mark B. N Hansen, ‘Media Theory’, Theory, Culture and Society, 23, 2–3 (2006): 297–306, p305.
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Although, in various ways, media studies has complicated earlier mass media models (most
importantly through studying the diversity of audience interpretations), it is its original 
relation to centralized mass media that continues to shape its dominant interpretative 
frameworks and research priorities [...] A research agenda focused almost exclusively on 
the production, circulation and reception of mainstream media risks forfeiting media 
studies’ critical edge. Its underlying assumptions miss critical dimensions of media 
change.51 
If media studies has tended to bracket issues around the industrialised nature of media production in 
favor of studying the consumption of media and the ‘diversity of media interpretations’, that focus on 
consumption becomes harder to justify when the conditions of media production are changing so 
rapidly.  Similarly if the object of media studies is shifting away from the exclusive study of what 
Couldry calls ‘centralized mass media’ then one consequence may well be a renewed need to decenter 
mass media, that is, to understand their historical and technological specificity. It is exactly these 
questions that, as we have seen, Stiegler’s work opens up. More widely, it allows us to think about the 
technological changes associated, for example, with the rise of networks without committing us to 
technological determinism. As has been argued, the technical object here is also a source of 
contingency (or accidentality) not a threat to it. Stiegler’s aporetic understanding of the relationship 
between technology and society fundamentally means neither term is privileged, nor is the former 
dissolved in the latter. 
51 Nick Couldry, ‘Transvaluing media studies: or, beyond the myth of the mediated centre’, in J. Curran and D. Morley 
(eds), Media and Cultural Theory, London, Routledge, 2006, p177–8.
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